Qualia problem

Qualia should therefore be understood as: The subjective experience of a spiritual – i.e. non-material state. And it is claimed: This can only be generated by the (likewise) non-material consciousness and not by the brain.

My Comment: Every mental state that we experience comes naturally from the brain.

Even today, people still believe in immaterial spirits. This belief found its way into metaphysics in antiquity. In modern times the name has been renamed ontology.

Of course, ghosts cannot be proved. And so people can create any number of myths with it.

This also includes the Mar Qualia. This should show that humans are capable of immaterial sensations. This is relatively easy to disprove since all feelings come from the brain.

The mental (spiritual) states are located in the midpoints (neuron networks). They can be activated by sensors or aims, for example.

Because everything that one perceives first reaches the brain as information from the senses, is converted by it into a mental state according to its aims, among other things, which then possibly goes back to consciousness. The subjective experience content then arises from this. This means that it is not the consciousness that determines the view of the world, but the brain.

This is why different people often react differently to the same situation.

"Mental" means spiritual.

"Mind" means: The ability to jump from one network of neurons (midpoint) to others in the brain at lightning speed in order to seek information regarding (new) aims.

The mental state is generated in the brain by information from the outside and inside world. Depending on the relevance, the consciousness (the sensor system) is then further activated, which is experienced.

This back and forth (brain> consciousness> brain> consciousness ...) could rock up more and more so that one is completely in the midpoints, for example the music can rise.

It is ignored by many (and therefore leads to a wrong view): The world is not the way we see it, but we perceive it as our aims (which are in the brain - more precisely: in the neural networks - they show us.

So, three reasons can be named that the Qualia problem proponents cannot perceive because they have other aims (for example not to allow materialism for life and to portray human beings as a being that spiritually surpasses everything - except for God or the like higher powers): They mean:

1. the world they see is the same for everyone,

2. They are not clear about the central role of aims

3. And they do not recognize the working methods and effects of the neural networks (midpoints).

People who say that there is a qualia problem that cannot be solved with a materialistic idea also have serious problems of understanding and explanation: They speak of consciousness and spirit, but cannot do either explain convincingly - and accordingly not understand.

Again, and again the "argument" comes up with them that no subjective experience content can be explained from matter.

This is wrong: in the beginning of life organic substances were created from inorganic substances (both are of course materialistic).

That this is possible has been proven in many different experiments.

This is how organic substances came about. These developed and created new structures by means of evolution towards the aim of life. Over time, the brain in particular played an increasingly central role as a control system.

The difficulty lies particularly in the fact that people do not want to admit that consciousness is merely an amplification of the senses in order to transmit information to the corresponding neural networks.

So, it is claimed that consciousness is something quite extraordinary that cannot be explained with physical and chemical principles.

To equate it merely with increased perception of the senses, which run on the fundamentals of physics and chemistry, is completely rejected because it does not fit into the picture that they have of consciousness in them.

Since i.a. these philosophers are shaped by their focus “metaphysics” (keywords: immortal soul, body-soul problem, free will, God, etc.), they are blind to the fact that one is with the brain, with whose physical and chemical fundamentals, mental subjective experiences and consciousness can certainly explain.

The midpoint “metaphysics” is the trap for their incomprehension.

It is like before with the Copernican system: The midpoint, the geocentric worldview - the earth is in the center of the universe - prevented the insight into the heliocentric worldview: The Earth is just a planet that moves around the sun. The leading intellectual class at that time could not break away from this midpoint located in them, the geocentric view of the world.

It only went out in the following generations.

The current view of consciousness is similar. This is not something that makes decisions and directs the brain, but it is controlled by the brain, which activates the consciousness accordingly through the respective information so that it can be experienced with strengthened senses and provides further information.

When one speaks of mental abilities, one actually means - often without being aware of it - the neural networks that have formed on the basis of aims. (They used to be unrecognizable. Today, computers can make them visible with the appropriate programs.) The more effectively and flexibly the midpoints interact with one another, the more mental abilities one has.

Again: "mind" because we cannot directly recognize the neural networks with our senses. They can be activated quickly and deactivated again just as quickly - like a ghost that appears and disappears again.

I would like to explain it again in terms of the musical experience: sensory impressions and stimuli are conveyed to the brain through perception. This activates the music midpoints stored in the brain. The brain qualifies the value of the sensory impressions according to its aims. People become aware of this through feelings, if the melody is an important aim for them, in order to experience the resulting feelings. The activated consciousness sends this information via the music to the brain, more precisely: to the corresponding midpoints (neural networks), which thereby generate increased feelings in the consciousness. This can build up more and more, so that one is completely absorbed in these  midpoints. So, all other neural networks are more or less reduced in value.

To underpin the fact that music is found in the brain: there are musical and not so musical people. Where else than in the brain should this respective feeling or non-perception be genetically or epigenetically stored and take place?

One more remark on the problem of intentionality in philosophy (i.e., the ability of humans to relate to something - for example to real or only imagined objects, properties or facts): If one assumes that consciousness and the SELF have mental states (outside, so to speak the brain's existing ghosts, immaterial), then you also have a problem.

This is based on statements by past philosophers who knew little about the functions of the brain. (If you don't know something, you often replace it with fantasies.)

But if one realistically assumes that these are states of the brain, then this problem does not exist.

Intentionality can therefore easily be explained with the aims in the brain.

Appendix:

Mary's room (thought experiment)

This is an example of the bizarre conclusions that a goal that must be achieved can lead the brain to. And it exemplifies the psychological complex (here a compulsive attitude that cannot be influenced or can only be influenced with great resistance).

The experiment is intended to prove that experience has a spiritual (immaterial) basis and cannot be explained solely with concrete scientific results (which are ultimately always material).

The following scenario was conceived for this purpose:

The fictional super-scientist Mary has been locked in a laboratory where everything is painted in shades of grey since birth. So she's never seen colour before. At the same time, she is an outstanding physiologist who knows all the physical facts about seeing colours. However, when she is finally released from the lab, she learns what colours look like for the first time.

According to the author who came up with it, this is supposed to be proof that someone who perceives something for the first-time experiences it with their metaphysical mind.

Like everything in this field, which is now called ontology, this spirit is not explained (as is usual here in this discipline of philosophy.)

The question that the author posed at the heart of his proof of immaterial experience was: Did she learn something new about colour from this, even though she already knew all about it? If so, then the evidence for non-material experience would be established.

Since this experiment is still considered conclusive and still haunts certain minds, I would like to comment on it as follows:

Everyone has the ability to see colour (unless a genetic defect causes colour blindness). This natural aptitude is activated and experienced the moment colour comes into play. A basic learning of colours - in the sense of: "Wasn't there before" - does not take place.